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Fortress: Fork Resistant Transparency logs Relying on Social graph Structure

Anastasiia Kucherenko, Melissa Chase, Esha Ghosh · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.26327 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Chinese

透明度服务器交互信号系统 - 如关键透明度(KT),证书透明度和二进制透明度 - 要求所有诚实参与者在未受信任的服务器密钥目录中看到相同的观点,或者,如果不这样做,透明度系统已经被公开检测到错误的行为。 每个现有的设计都用外部信任关了这个差距:一个公开可用的通讯板(BB),一个区块链,或一个安全隐私网络(OOB)在审计人员中出现了相同的观点。 我们观察到,透明度系统已经有一个内置的总资源,到目前为止已经被忽视:由用户自己诱导的社会图表。 我们询问它是否可以完全取代通讯板或外部谣言频道,并在负

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Transparency systems -- such as Key Transparency (KT), Certificate Transparency, and binary transparency -- require that all honest participants see the same view of an untrusted server's directory, or, failing that, that the misbehaviour is publicly detected. Every existing design closes this gap with an external trust anchor: a publicly available bulletin board (BB), a blockchain, or an out-of-band (OOB) gossip network among auditors. We observe that transparency systems already have a built-in resource that has so far been overlooked: the social graph induced by the users themselves. We ask whether it can replace the bulletin board or the external gossip channel entirely, and answer in the affirmative (if occasional out-of-band interactions are allowed). We formalise a new primitive, Social-Graph based Forking-Resilient Transparency (sg-FORT), which captures the security guarantees of a BB-free transparency system and we construct Fortress Fork Resistant Transparency logs Relying on Social graph Structure, to our knowledge the first such protocol. In every epoch either all users output the same post, or at least one honest user produces a publicly verifiable Proof of Misbehaviour. Our guarantees hold against an arbitrary malicious server, including a snapshot adversary that may compromise a user and learn its secret state, as long as the server does not compromise close users. In honest executions, OOB interactions occur only when a user resets their secrets, so the total OOB cost approaches the natural lower bound of one call per reset -- dramatically below the full-gossip alternative. We prove security under standard cryptographic assumptions on signatures and dictionary commitment. Under simplifying assumptions (synchronous epochs, always-online users), we view this as a first feasibility result that opens up the design space of social-graph-based transparency systems.

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Topics: Computer science, Computer security, Transparency (behavior), Gossip, Verifiable secret sharing, Compromise

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