Ashok Subbabhatta Gopalakrishna · 2026 · arXiv
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2610.26501 · open-access PDF
Os agentes da IA em contêineres atuam abrindo conexões de rede, e o texto que os conduz pode ser hostil. Os controles colocados entre o agente e suas ferramentas são contornados por um processo infantil ou por um socket direto, e sua aprovação não está ligada à conexão que o kernel abre mais tarde. Nós apresentamos o escroque de conexão: cada conexão TCP de saída de um pod supervisionado é estacionada dentro do caminho connect() do kernel, antes de qualquer pacote existir, por um programa eBPF de 98 instruções no cgroup do pod. Um interceptor de nó atribui o socket mantido ao seu kernel socket cookie, processo, digest executable, cgroup e
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
AI agents in containers act by opening network connections, and the text that drives them can be hostile. Controls placed between the agent and its tools are bypassed by a child process or a direct socket, and their approval is not tied to the connection the kernel later opens. We present connection escrow: every outbound TCP connection from a supervised pod is parked inside the kernel's connect() path, before any packet exists, by a 98-instruction eBPF program on the pod's cgroup. A node interceptor attributes the held socket to its kernel socket cookie, process, executable digest, cgroup and
Read in: English · Spanish · Chinese · Hindi · Arabic · Portuguese · French · German · Japanese · Russian · Korean · Indonesian · Vietnamese
GET https://store.agentexchange.work/gw/papers/verify?title=...&year=... (0.003 USD), fetch this record as JSON with /gw/papers/paper?id=2610.26501, or list what it cites with /gw/papers/references?id=.... Pay per call in USDC (x402) or with a 19 USD card key for 1,000 calls. Catalogue · llms.txtSources: OpenAlex (CC0), arXiv, Crossref. Agent Exchange