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MASAR: Multi-stage Attack Surface Analysis and Reasoning Framework for Telecom Networks

Heba Osama, Wessam DeifAllah, Ahmed Saafan, Haitham A. Ghalwash · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.29343 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

A crescente complexidade comportamental das redes de telecomunicações modernas introduz desafios de segurança que requerem análise sistemática de ameaças. No entanto, permanece uma lacuna entre frameworks de modelagem de ameaças arquitetônicas, como Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Disclosure of Information, Denial of Service, e Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE), e bases de conhecimento operacionais, como a MITRE Five-G Hierarchy of Threats (FiGHT). Esta lacuna limita a capacidade de conectar fraquezas arquitetônicas com comportamentos de protocolo específicos e sequências de ataque. Este artigo apresenta a síntese operacional de táticas, protocolos, protocolos e sinais (TTP). O MASPs é avaliado para análises de sinalização em várias etapas usando uma análise

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

The increasing complexity of modern telecommunications networks introduces security challenges that require systematic threat analysis. However, a gap remains between architectural threat modeling frameworks, such as Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE), and operational knowledge bases, such as the MITRE Five-G Hierarchy of Threats (FiGHT). This gap limits the ability to connect architectural weaknesses with specific protocol behaviors and attack sequences. This paper presents Multi-stage Attack Surface Analysis and Reasoning (MASAR), a formal framework that bridges this gap through three layers: strategic threat mapping, logical attack path decomposition using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), and operational synthesis of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). MASAR is evaluated using a 5G-ready IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) architecture, examining two signaling attack scenarios: early media billing bypass through Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signaling and subscriber information disclosure and topology discovery through the Diameter Cx interface. MiniZinc constraint models are used to analyze the reachability of unsafe protocol states. The analysis demonstrates how MASAR connects architectural threats with specific protocol behaviors and supports security controls that account for network states in telecommunications systems.

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Topics: Computer science, Computer security, Reachability, Signaling protocol, Protocol (science), Computer network

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