Ryan Vogt, Ioanis Nikolaidis, Mario A. Nascimento · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.29772 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF
Considérez un réseau de radio sans fil standard multi-hop dans lequel les nœuds transmettent des messages les uns aux autres. Alors que le contenu des messages peut être sensible et donc crypté, le fait même que deux radios communiquent peut divulguer des informations sensibles sur l'emplacement physique de l'origine et l'emplacement physique de la destination.Nous enquêtons sur le compromis entre la protection de la confidentialité de l'emplacement actuel d'un utilisateur et la confidentialité de son emplacement d'intérêt, et comment l'utilisateur devrait choisir des destinations stupides pour obscurcir ses requêtes.
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
Consider a standard multi-hop wireless radio network in which nodes relay messages for one another. While the contents of messages may be sensitive and thus encrypted, the very fact that two radios communicated can leak sensitive information about both the physical location of the origin and the physical location of the destination. We investigate the trade-off between protecting the privacy of a user's current location and the privacy of their location of interest, and how the user should choose dummy destinations to obfuscate their queries.
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Topics: Computer science, Computer security, Information privacy, Privacy protection, Internet privacy, Privacy software
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