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FVQKD: A Formal Verification of Quantum Key Distribution Security in Rocq

Ruixuan Deng, Zhengfeng Ji, Jiayu Zhang, Li Zhou · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.30645 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Chinese

量子密钥布罗克斯分布(QKD),其安全性来自量子力学而不是计算假设,正在转向标准化和商业部署,但其安全保障依赖于手工验证的技术上敏感的证据。正式验证缩小了这个差距,建立了两个因素的保证:来自物理原理的无条件安全和机器验证的证据反对推理错误。我们介绍了FVQKD,一个用于机器验证QKD安全证据的Rocq库。它的第一个结果是完整的,端到端的机械验证的复合性,对BB84的终端密钥安全的确认。机械化重建了从第一个原理的完整的安全证据基础设施,包括平滑进制框架,生存不确定性关系和QQQ

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD), whose security is derived from quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions, is moving into standardization and commercial deployment. Yet its security guarantees rest on technically delicate proofs checked by hand. Formal verification closes this gap, establishing a two-factor assurance: unconditional security from physical principles, and machine-checked proofs against reasoning errors. We present FVQKD, a Rocq library for machine-checking QKD security proofs. Its first result is a complete, end-to-end machine-checked proof of composable, finite-key security for BB84. The mechanization reconstructs the complete proof infrastructure from first principles, including the smooth entropy framework, the entropic uncertainty relation, and the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma. It uncovers necessary side conditions that the published argument leaves unstated, one of which reveals a missing proof branch, and it grounds the information-theoretic bound in a formal semantics of protocol execution, which the pen-and-paper analysis lacks. The proof is entirely admit-free, relying only on the Rocq kernel and standard foundational axioms. To our knowledge, this is the first end-to-end formal verification of a QKD security proof. Built on MathComp, MathComp-Analysis, and CoqQ, the development provides quantum-information infrastructure designed for reuse across broader QKD variants and quantum cryptography applications.

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Topics: Quantum key distribution, Mathematical proof, Computer science, Theoretical computer science, Soundness, Quantum cryptography

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