Jan Morgan, Anchi Xia · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.22830 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF
ونحن نقدم نظرة على العقوبات التجارية المثالية مع ثلاثة لاعبين استراتيجيين: Home (sanctioner)، Foreign (target) و Bystander. Bystander يمكن أن تعمل بشكل منفصل أو حليف مع أي طرف تحت ضغط المشاركة. ونحن نستند إلى ثلاثة نتائج جديدة. أولاً، أعضاء التحالف يحددون بشكل عام عقوبات مختلفة، سواء في وقت Stackelberg أو عندما تكون التراخيص غير كافية. ثانياً، مع تشديد العقوبات، يمكن أن تحسن منافع Home حتى خارج شروط التداول الفردية الأفضل بسبب التفاعلات الاستراتيجية. ثانياً، ونحن نحدد أهداف العقوبات الممكنة عندما تتنافس Home و Foreign على دعم Bystander. يحدث تطبيق بديل مع التنافس: Home يمنح Foreign الفوز، ولكن نقل Fore
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
We provide a theory of optimal trade sanctions with three strategic players: Home (sanctioner), Foreign (target), and Bystander. Bystander may act unilaterally or ally with either party subject to a participation constraint. We derive three novel results. First, members of a coalition generically set different tariffs either under Stackelberg timing or when transfers are imperfect. Second, as sanctions tighten, Home's welfare can improve even beyond the unilateral terms-of-trade optimum due to strategic interactions. Third, we characterize feasible sanctions targets when Home and Foreign compete for Bystander's support. An alternative implementation arises with competition: Home lets Foreign win, but Foreign's transfer to Bystander implements the sanctions target. We apply our model to sanctions against Russian crude. In a calibration exercise, cooperation among India, China, and Russia best matches observed data. Sanctions could have been roughly 70% more effective had China and India acted unilaterally or had the sanctioning coalition made them a better offer.
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Topics: Sanctions, Stackelberg competition, Bystander effect, Foreign policy, Welfare, China
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