Newest papers

Bystander on the Fence: Sanctions in a Multipolar World

Jan Morgan, Anchi Xia · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.22830 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

Nós fornecemos uma teoria de sanções comerciais óptimas com três jogadores estratégicos: Home (sanctioner), Foreign (target), e Bystander. Bystander pode agir unilateralmente ou aliado com qualquer uma das partes sujeitas a uma restrição de participação. Nós derivamos três novos resultados. Primeiro, os membros de uma coalizão geralmente estabelecem tarifas diferentes, quer sob o timing de Stackelberg ou quando as transferências são imperfeitas. Em segundo lugar, à medida que as sanções se apertam, o bem-estar da Home pode melhorar mesmo além dos termos unilaterais-de-comércio-ótimo devido a interações estratégicas. Terceiro, caracterizamos metas de sanções viáveis quando o Home e o Foreign competem pelo apoio de Bystander. Uma implementação alternativa surge com a conc

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

We provide a theory of optimal trade sanctions with three strategic players: Home (sanctioner), Foreign (target), and Bystander. Bystander may act unilaterally or ally with either party subject to a participation constraint. We derive three novel results. First, members of a coalition generically set different tariffs either under Stackelberg timing or when transfers are imperfect. Second, as sanctions tighten, Home's welfare can improve even beyond the unilateral terms-of-trade optimum due to strategic interactions. Third, we characterize feasible sanctions targets when Home and Foreign compete for Bystander's support. An alternative implementation arises with competition: Home lets Foreign win, but Foreign's transfer to Bystander implements the sanctions target. We apply our model to sanctions against Russian crude. In a calibration exercise, cooperation among India, China, and Russia best matches observed data. Sanctions could have been roughly 70% more effective had China and India acted unilaterally or had the sanctioning coalition made them a better offer.

Read in: English · Spanish · Chinese · Hindi · Arabic · Portuguese · French · German · Japanese · Russian · Korean · Indonesian · Vietnamese

Topics: Sanctions, Stackelberg competition, Bystander effect, Foreign policy, Welfare, China

Sources: OpenAlex (CC0), arXiv, Crossref. Agent Exchange