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Market Efficiency in a Changing Asset Population: Mobility, Entry, and Survival over Cryptocurrency's Full History

Antonis Ballis, Christos Ioannidis · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.23283 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

A eficiência de forma fraca implica restrições de simetria no movimento da cadeia de Markov que governa a distribuição de capitalização de criptomoedas. Nós os testamos na população listada completa: 8.970 ativos, 690 seções semanais, de 2013 a 2026, com entrada, saída e sobrevivência observadas em vez de inferidas. A simetria é rejeitada em todas as épocas, mas a assimetria cai em setenta por cento, e o que converge é o churn de composição impulsionado por entrada em vez das avaliações próprias das moedas. O decile inferior ganha 27.5% por semana em papel e nada entre os ativos que negociam, com capacidade de US $ 293.000. A compensação por negligência existe exatamente onde a negociação não acontece.

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Weak-form efficiency implies symmetry restrictions on the Markov chain governing movement across the cryptocurrency capitalisation distribution. We test them on the full listed population: 8,970 assets, 690 weekly cross-sections, 2013 to 2026, with entry, exit and survival observed rather than inferred. Symmetry is rejected in every era, but the asymmetry falls by seventy percent, and what converged is entry-driven compositional churn rather than coins' own valuations. The bottom decile earns 27.5% per week on paper and nothing among assets that trade, on capacity of $293,000. Compensation for neglect exists precisely where trading does not.

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Topics: Decile, Asset (computer security), Economics, Markov chain, Market capitalization, Compensation (psychology)

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