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Execution-Time Validation of Context-Carrying Action Intents in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

Luca D’Agati, Giuseppe Tricomi, Fabio Orazio Mirto, Merlino Giovanni · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.27971 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Indonesian

Dalam hal ini, perintah-perintah dari operator dan perencana mencapai kontroler setelah inferensi, konfirmasi, dan transportasi, dan pabrik mungkin telah berubah sementara waktu, misalnya oleh penghentian operator. Perintah seperti itu dilepaskan, atau mengambil efek, ketika itu tidak lagi benar. Kami menyebut ini penghentian eksekusi dan bertanya komponen mana yang harus melakukan pemeriksaan terakhir, dan melawan versi mana. Action Intent Schema (AIS) adalah kontrak di mana seorang produsen menyatakan berapa lama keputusan tetap valid dan apa yang ia asumsikan. Runtime XAIR memeriksa setiap sebelum rilis niat, dapat melakukan verifikasi otorisasi secara atomik di toko konteks, dan dapat melepaskannya sebagai perintah komposisi-kondisional, yang mana kontroler hanya mengeksekusi versi niatnya jika negara tidak berubah. Dalam ablations terkontrol dengan kebenaran yang dinyatakan

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

In industrial cells, commands from learned policies, operators and schedulers reach the controller after inference, confirmation and transport, and the plant may have changed meanwhile, for instance by an operator pause. Such a command is released, or takes effect, when it is no longer correct. We call this the execution gap and ask which component should make the last check, and against which version of which state. The Action Intent Schema (AIS) is a contract in which a producer states how long its decision stays valid and what it assumes. The runtime XAIR rechecks each intent before release, can commit its authorization atomically in the context store, and can release it as a version-conditional command, which the controller executes only if its version of the state is unchanged. In controlled ablations with declared ground truth on emulated and physical cells, OpenPLC and ARM and RISC-V boards, a check on a replica always left an unprotected interval: a pause written from a few to over 100ms after submission escaped it. Only a check in the scan of a software controller, either a controller-local interlock or the version-conditional command, closed the interval for the state that controller owns; only the version-conditional command also refused commands after a pause that had been undone. A global version revoked up to every valid command under unrelated updates. Versions scoped to what the intent reads, or to the truth of its predicates, did not; with continuous signals on the variables the intent reads, only the latter avoided false revocations, though it burdens the store as predicates accumulate. On one embedded-board core, XAIR validated 148-168 intents/s.

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Topics: Commit, Computer science, Context (archaeology), Computer security, Software, Action (physics)

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