Xiangyu Zhang, Yucheng Su, Lingling Fan, Yinan Li, Sen Chen · 2026 · arXiv
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2610.30218 · open-access PDF
现代Android应用广泛依赖本地图书馆,通过Java Native Interface(JNI)连接Java/Kotlin和C++。然而,这种跨语言的互操作将安全的Android Runtime暴露在不安全的C/C++世界中,创造了一个攻击表面,该表面已被反复利用用于完全设备的妥协。
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
Modern Android apps extensively rely on native libraries, bridging Java/Kotlin and C/C++ through the Java Native Interface (JNI). This cross-language interoperation, however, exposes the memory-safe Android Runtime to the unsafe C/C++ world, creating an attack surface that has been repeatedly exploited for full device compromise. While fuzzing is a proven technique for vetting native libraries, state-of-the-art harness generation tools struggle to faithfully capture closed-source cross-language API usage: (i) precise program analysis across the JNI boundary does not scale, whereas lightweight
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