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SPECTER: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Systems via USB Power Modulation

Hyeongjun Choi, Ji Hyuk Jung, Ji Hye Yoon · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.28401 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Spanish

Presentamos SPECTER, un canal oculto post-compromiso que utiliza el control de potencia USB del anfitrión para filtrar información de los sistemas aéreos y segregados por la red. Un transmisor con privilegios administrativos codifica bits a través de la gestión de energía USB o las operaciones del estado del dispositivo sin colocar la carga útil en las transferencias de datos USB. Las señales resultantes se recuperan a través de tres vías alternativas del receptor basadas en los estados de carga del teléfono inteligente, el comportamiento periférico visible y la actividad RF de campo cercano. Experimentos en Windows 10 y Ubuntu 22.04 demuestran el canal en hardware de mercancías, con señalización del estado de carga a 0.2-0.25 bits/sec en los dispositivos Android y iOS y señalización del estado periférico a 1.0 bits/sec usando un ratón USB

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

We present SPECTER, a post-compromise covert channel that uses host-side USB power control to exfiltrate information from air-gapped and network-segregated systems. A transmitter with administrative privileges encodes bits through USB power-management or device-state operations without placing the payload in USB data transfers. The resulting signals are recovered through three alternative receiver paths based on smartphone charging states, visible peripheral behavior, and near-field RF activity. Experiments on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 demonstrate the channel on commodity hardware, with charging-state signaling at 0.2-0.25 bit/sec across Android and iOS devices and peripheral-state signaling at 1.0 bit/sec using a USB mouse on Windows. RF reception is demonstrated using a software-defined radio with a loop antenna in direct contact with the USB cable. Channel availability and observable side effects depend on the host configuration, connected device, and receiver path. These results identify host-side USB power control as a mechanism for low-rate exfiltration of short secrets and motivate treating USB power-management and device-state events as security-relevant telemetry.

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Topics: USB, USB hub, Payload (computing), Computer science, Host controller interface, Transmitter

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