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SPECTER: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Systems via USB Power Modulation

Hyeongjun Choi, Ji Hyuk Jung, Ji Hye Yoon · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.28401 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

Um transmissor com privilégios administrativos codifica bits através de operações de gerenciamento de energia USB ou dispositivo-estado sem colocar a carga útil em transferências de dados USB. Os sinais resultantes são recuperados através de três caminhos de receptor alternativos baseados em estados de carregamento de smartphones, comportamento periférico visível e atividade RF de campo próximo. Experimentos no Windows 10 e Ubuntu 22.04 demonstram o canal em hardware de commodity, com sinalização de estado de carregamento em 0,2-0.25 bits/sec em dispositivos Android e iOS e sinalização de estado periférico em 1,0 bits/sec usando um mouse USB no Windows. A recepção RF é demonstrada usando um rádio definido por software com uma antena em contato direto com o cabo USB. A disponibilidade do canal e os efeitos observáveis dependem da configuração lateral do

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

We present SPECTER, a post-compromise covert channel that uses host-side USB power control to exfiltrate information from air-gapped and network-segregated systems. A transmitter with administrative privileges encodes bits through USB power-management or device-state operations without placing the payload in USB data transfers. The resulting signals are recovered through three alternative receiver paths based on smartphone charging states, visible peripheral behavior, and near-field RF activity. Experiments on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 demonstrate the channel on commodity hardware, with charging-state signaling at 0.2-0.25 bit/sec across Android and iOS devices and peripheral-state signaling at 1.0 bit/sec using a USB mouse on Windows. RF reception is demonstrated using a software-defined radio with a loop antenna in direct contact with the USB cable. Channel availability and observable side effects depend on the host configuration, connected device, and receiver path. These results identify host-side USB power control as a mechanism for low-rate exfiltration of short secrets and motivate treating USB power-management and device-state events as security-relevant telemetry.

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Topics: USB, USB hub, Payload (computing), Computer science, Host controller interface, Transmitter

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