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SPECTER: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Systems via USB Power Modulation

Hyeongjun Choi, Ji Hyuk Jung, Ji Hye Yoon · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.28401 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Indonesian

Kami menyajikan SPECTER, saluran tersembunyi pasca-kompromi yang menggunakan kontrol daya USB host-side untuk mengekfiltrasi informasi dari sistem yang terpisah dari udara dan jaringan. Transmitter dengan hak administrasi mengkodekan bit melalui manajemen daya USB atau operasi perangkat-state tanpa menempatkan beban dalam transfer data USB. Sinyal yang dihasilkan dikumpulkan melalui tiga jalur penerima alternatif berdasarkan status pengisian smartphone, perilaku perifer yang terlihat, dan aktivitas RF dekat lapangan. Eksperimen pada Windows 10 dan Ubuntu 22.04 menunjukkan saluran pada perangkat keras komoditas, dengan sinyal status pengisian pada 0.2-0.25 bit/sec di seluruh perangkat Android dan iOS dan sinyal status perifer pada 1.0 bit/sec menggunakan mouse USB di Windows. penerimaan RF ditunjukkan menggunakan radio perangkat lunak yang didefinisikan dengan loop antenna dalam kontak langsung dengan kabel USB. Kanal tersedia dan

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

We present SPECTER, a post-compromise covert channel that uses host-side USB power control to exfiltrate information from air-gapped and network-segregated systems. A transmitter with administrative privileges encodes bits through USB power-management or device-state operations without placing the payload in USB data transfers. The resulting signals are recovered through three alternative receiver paths based on smartphone charging states, visible peripheral behavior, and near-field RF activity. Experiments on Windows 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 demonstrate the channel on commodity hardware, with charging-state signaling at 0.2-0.25 bit/sec across Android and iOS devices and peripheral-state signaling at 1.0 bit/sec using a USB mouse on Windows. RF reception is demonstrated using a software-defined radio with a loop antenna in direct contact with the USB cable. Channel availability and observable side effects depend on the host configuration, connected device, and receiver path. These results identify host-side USB power control as a mechanism for low-rate exfiltration of short secrets and motivate treating USB power-management and device-state events as security-relevant telemetry.

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Topics: USB, USB hub, Payload (computing), Computer science, Host controller interface, Transmitter

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