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Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base

Pranay Anchuri, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.03922 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Indonesian

Parameter flash sekarang membagi lelang gas prioritas blok menjadi lelang sekuensial yang lebih pendek yang melakukan urutan transaksi sebelum blok selesai. Kami bertanya bagaimana kaden lelang yang lebih rendah mempengaruhi penawaran dan persaingan di antara arbitrager otomatis, atau pencari. Pada bulan Juli 2025 Base menggantikan lelang gas prioritas 2 s tunggal dengan lelang 200 ms yang lebih pendek. Kami menggunakan perubahan ini untuk memperkirakan respon pencari dari data rantai saja. Pada panel alamat-hari pencari 3.032 dan 8,053 pengendalian biaya yang cocok dengan kegiatan, desain perbedaan-dalam-perbedaan informasi memperkirakan penurunan 0,187 gwei dalam biaya efisien prioritas (59% dari rata-rata pre-periode pencari). Perbandingan nilai prioritas pencari yang dibayarkan di bagian kesepuluh blok gas jatuh dari 0,98 menjadi 0,28. Kompresi biaya ini

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Flashblocks divide a block's priority gas auction into shorter sequential auctions that commit transaction order before the block is complete. We ask how this auction cadence affects bidding and competition among automated arbitrageurs, or searchers. In July 2025 Base replaced a single 2 s auction with ten 200 ms auctions. We use this change to estimate the searcher response from on-chain data alone. On an address-day panel of 3,032 searchers and 8,053 activity-matched controls, a difference-in-differences design estimates a 0.187 gwei fall in the effective priority fee (59% of the searcher pre-period mean). The share of searcher priority-fee value paid in the first tenth of block gas falls from 0.98 to 0.28. This fee compression is the identified effect. The revert-rate response is not (causally) identified and is reported descriptively. At the level of a single opportunity, the winning fee splits into an approximately invariant floor and a competitive premium. The premium scales about linearly with auction duration at high contention and less steeply at low contention. A first-price auction model with uncertain arrival and partial payments by losing searchers accounts for this pattern. We match attempts to the pool they contest. A higher-fee transaction reverts behind a lower-fee winner that landed earlier in 1.9 to 2.7% of contested opportunities by value, an upper bound. Latency therefore decides part of the ordering. A micro-auction model projects diminishing returns from shortening the window below 200 ms, as bids approach a nonzero floor. Rollups such as Arbitrum One now make auction cadence a governance tunable parameter, so these estimates inform how it is set.

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Topics: Bidding, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, English auction, Common value auction, Commit, Computer science

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