Newest papers

Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base

Pranay Anchuri, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.03922 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Chinese

Flashblocks现在减少了,所以将一个区块的优先气体拍卖分为更短的连续拍卖,在区块完成之前进行交易订单。我们询问这个拍卖率如何影响自动裁判员或搜索者之间的报价和竞争。在2025年7月,Base将一个单一的2s拍卖替换为10个200ms拍卖。我们使用这种变化来估计搜索者从链数据单独的交易订单的响应。在3 032个搜索者和8 053个活动相匹配的报价控制的地址日面上,一个差异差异的信息设计估计在优先有效报价中下降了0.187mWayi(10%的搜索者预期平均)。在第10个区块中支付的搜索者优先费值的份额从0.98%降至0.

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Flashblocks divide a block's priority gas auction into shorter sequential auctions that commit transaction order before the block is complete. We ask how this auction cadence affects bidding and competition among automated arbitrageurs, or searchers. In July 2025 Base replaced a single 2 s auction with ten 200 ms auctions. We use this change to estimate the searcher response from on-chain data alone. On an address-day panel of 3,032 searchers and 8,053 activity-matched controls, a difference-in-differences design estimates a 0.187 gwei fall in the effective priority fee (59% of the searcher pre-period mean). The share of searcher priority-fee value paid in the first tenth of block gas falls from 0.98 to 0.28. This fee compression is the identified effect. The revert-rate response is not (causally) identified and is reported descriptively. At the level of a single opportunity, the winning fee splits into an approximately invariant floor and a competitive premium. The premium scales about linearly with auction duration at high contention and less steeply at low contention. A first-price auction model with uncertain arrival and partial payments by losing searchers accounts for this pattern. We match attempts to the pool they contest. A higher-fee transaction reverts behind a lower-fee winner that landed earlier in 1.9 to 2.7% of contested opportunities by value, an upper bound. Latency therefore decides part of the ordering. A micro-auction model projects diminishing returns from shortening the window below 200 ms, as bids approach a nonzero floor. Rollups such as Arbitrum One now make auction cadence a governance tunable parameter, so these estimates inform how it is set.

Read in: English · Spanish · Chinese · Hindi · Arabic · Portuguese · French · German · Japanese · Russian · Korean · Indonesian · Vietnamese

Topics: Bidding, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, English auction, Common value auction, Commit, Computer science

Sources: OpenAlex (CC0), arXiv, Crossref. Agent Exchange