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Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base

Pranay Anchuri, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.03922 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Korean

플래시 블록은 블록이 완료되기 전에 트랜잭션 명령을 수행하는 짧은 연속 경매로 블록의 우선 순위 가스 경매를 분할합니다. 우리는이 경매 수율이 자동화 된 중재자 또는 검색자 사이의 경매 및 경쟁에 영향을 미치는 방법을 묻습니다. 7 월 2025에서 Base는 단일 2 s 경매를 10 개의 200 ms 경매로 대체했습니다. 우리는 블록에만 거래 순서를 수행하기 전에 검색자 응답을 추정하기 위해이 변화를 사용합니다. 3,032 검색자와 8,053 활동과 일치하는 프리미엄 통제의 주소-day 패널에서이 수수료 압축은 식별 된 효과입니다. 이 이전 창에 대한 응답은 (원인적으로 식별되지 않은) 어떻게 증가하고 마이크로 경매

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Flashblocks divide a block's priority gas auction into shorter sequential auctions that commit transaction order before the block is complete. We ask how this auction cadence affects bidding and competition among automated arbitrageurs, or searchers. In July 2025 Base replaced a single 2 s auction with ten 200 ms auctions. We use this change to estimate the searcher response from on-chain data alone. On an address-day panel of 3,032 searchers and 8,053 activity-matched controls, a difference-in-differences design estimates a 0.187 gwei fall in the effective priority fee (59% of the searcher pre-period mean). The share of searcher priority-fee value paid in the first tenth of block gas falls from 0.98 to 0.28. This fee compression is the identified effect. The revert-rate response is not (causally) identified and is reported descriptively. At the level of a single opportunity, the winning fee splits into an approximately invariant floor and a competitive premium. The premium scales about linearly with auction duration at high contention and less steeply at low contention. A first-price auction model with uncertain arrival and partial payments by losing searchers accounts for this pattern. We match attempts to the pool they contest. A higher-fee transaction reverts behind a lower-fee winner that landed earlier in 1.9 to 2.7% of contested opportunities by value, an upper bound. Latency therefore decides part of the ordering. A micro-auction model projects diminishing returns from shortening the window below 200 ms, as bids approach a nonzero floor. Rollups such as Arbitrum One now make auction cadence a governance tunable parameter, so these estimates inform how it is set.

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Topics: Bidding, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, English auction, Common value auction, Commit, Computer science

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