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Allocative Efficiency and the Returns to Innovation

K. Okumura · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.14969 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Japanese

イノベーションは、技術を向上させ、異なるマークアップを持つ生産者にインプットを再分配することによって福祉を変化させます。生産者がマークアップを最適に選択したとき、イノベーターの独自の出力と価格調整は、マージン上に個人の価値がないので、再分配は他人の反応を通じてのみその利益に影響を与えます。その市場で小さいイノベーターにとって、割り当て効率の変化はコスト節約と同じ順序であるが、その利益に達しません。プロセスイノベーターはコスト節約に支払われ、追加出力と下流マークアップを放棄します。2015年の米国公立企業にとって、これらの放棄されたマークアップは、その節約の平均26%を占めています。

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Innovation changes welfare by improving technology and reallocating inputs across producers with different markups. When producers choose markups optimally, an innovator's own output and price adjustments have no private value at the margin, so reallocation affects its profit only through others' responses. For an innovator small in its markets, the change in allocative efficiency is of the same order as its cost saving but does not reach its profit. A process innovator is paid its cost saving, forgoing its own and downstream markups on added output. For U.S. public firms in 2015, these forgone markups average 26 percent of that saving. For innovators accounting for 56 percent of sales, allocative efficiency rises or falls by more than a tenth of their private return. With estimated spillovers, patenting firms' R&D has a social return 6.24 times its private return.

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Topics: Allocative efficiency, Economics, Innovator, Profit (economics), Microeconomics, Welfare

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