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Spectrum of Liability: Forensically Sound Acquisition of Wireless Evidence for the Reconstruction of Maritime Cyber-Physical Incidents

Giacomo Longo, Alessandro Cantelli‐Forti, Alessio Merlo, Enrico Russo · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.25411 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

A navegação de verificação marítima moderna depende de entradas sem fio obrigatórias, principalmente GNSS e AIS, cuja recepção pode ser falsificada ou bloqueada. Quando ocorrem aterrissagens ou colisões, as investigações de responsabilidade e segurança muitas vezes se tornam sobre se a interferência de RF corrompe instrumentos de ponte corrompidos, mas os artefatos normalmente disponíveis (saídas de VDR, logs IBS, screenshots, mensagens decodificadas) são descartáveis, perdidos e fáceis de competir em procedimentos adversários. Introduzimos uma metodologia de aquisição forense de som que preserva a evidência sem fio upstream juntamente com o contexto contemporâneo mínimo necessário para interpretá-lo. Nossos registros de sistema coerentes, IQ multicanal

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Modern maritime navigation depends on mandatory wireless inputs, most notably GNSS and AIS, whose reception can be spoofed or jammed. When groundings or collisions occur, liability and safety investigations often turn on whether RF interference corrupted bridge instruments, yet the artifacts typically available (VDR outputs, IBS logs, screenshots, decoded messages) are downstream, lossy, and easy to contest in adversarial proceedings. We introduce a forensically sound acquisition methodology that preserves upstream wireless evidence together with the minimal contemporaneous context needed to interpret it. Our system records coherent, multichannel IQ across relevant bands while simultaneously collecting time-aligned receiver and instrument-state metadata (e.g., decoded AIS/GNSS outputs and NMEA sentences), enabling later re-decoding and physical-layer reanalysis tied to what the onboard stack indicated at the time. To make the record independently auditable, we package samples and metadata into a single append-only forensic envelope that cryptographically binds per-stream hash chains with trusted-time anchors and periodic checkpoints, allowing third parties to detect tampering (modification, truncation, splicing, cross-case substitution) and to verify the claimed recording window. A prototype implementation shows the approach is practical: integrity mechanisms add negligible storage overhead and modest compute cost at operationally relevant multiband capture rates.

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Topics: Computer science, Context (archaeology), Wireless, Metadata, Real-time computing, GNSS applications

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