Newest papers

Game of Phones: Harnessing Game Theory and LLMs in ‘Bot Wars’ to Counteract Phone Scams

Nardine Basta, Robin Carpentier, Benjamin Zhao, Dali Kaafar · 2026 · Lecture notes in computer science

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-37682-4_23 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Spanish

Las estafas telefónicas imponen costes sustanciales y crecientes a los individuos y a los sistemas financieros en todo el mundo, sin embargo, las contramedidas existentes no imponen costes de recursos a los perpetradores. El fraude estratégico, en el que los agentes automatizados involucran a los estafadores para agotar su capacidad operativa, ofrece una alternativa proactiva pero requiere una adaptación estratégica dinámica que los sistemas estáticos no pueden proporcionar. Introducimos un marco teórico del juego que permite a los LLM aprender estrategias eficaces de contrarreloj a través de la experiencia en el contexto sin ajustar adecuadamente.

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with em

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Topics: Computer science, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Benchmark (surveying), Phone, Computer security

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