Nardine Basta, Robin Carpentier, Benjamin Zhao, Dali Kaafar · 2026 · Lecture notes in computer science
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-37682-4_23 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF
电话诈骗给全球个人和金融系统带来了巨大的成本,但现有的反制措施不会给罪犯带来资源成本。 战略诈骗,其中自动代理人吸引诈骗者以消耗其操作能力,提供了一个积极的替代方案,但需要动态策略调整,而静态系统无法提供。 我们引入了一个游戏理论框架,使法学硕士能够通过背景经验学习有效的反策略,而无需精细调整。
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
Phone scams impose substantial and growing costs on individuals and financial systems worldwide, yet existing countermeasures impose no resource cost on perpetrators. Strategic scam-baiting, in which automated agents engage scammers to deplete their operational capacity, offers a proactive alternative but requires dynamic strategy adaptation that static systems cannot provide. We introduce a game-theoretic framework enabling LLMs to learn effective counter-strategies through in-context experience without fine-tuning. The framework models scammer-baiter interactions as a two-player game with em
Read in: English · Spanish · Chinese · Hindi · Arabic · Portuguese · French · German · Japanese · Russian · Korean · Indonesian · Vietnamese
Topics: Computer science, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, Benchmark (surveying), Phone, Computer security
GET https://store.agentexchange.work/gw/papers/verify?title=...&year=... (0.003 USD), fetch this record as JSON with /gw/papers/paper?id=2610.26781, or list what it cites with /gw/papers/references?id=.... Pay per call in USDC (x402) or with a 19 USD card key for 1,000 calls. Catalogue · llms.txtSources: OpenAlex (CC0), arXiv, Crossref. Agent Exchange