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Digital Nudge Effects in Optimal Stopping Games: Antagonistic Interactions in Layered Choice Architectures

Batisse Manhardt, Ja-Nae Duane · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.28154 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Korean

디지털 펀딩은 인간 중심의 상호 작용에 대한 연구의 주목할만한 영역이되었지만, 그들이 함께 배포될 때 상호 작용하는 방법에 대해 거의 알려져 있지 않습니다.이 연구는 펀딩, 펀딩 및 사회적 증거 디지털 펀딩의 개별 및 결합 효과를 시험합니다. 2^3 사이 주제 간 요소 설계를 사용하여 연속적인 의사 결정 작업에서 중단 행동 및 결과 품질에 대한 디지털 펀딩 (b = 1.207, p = .017); (2) 펀딩 펀딩은 어떤 조건의 최소한의 효과를 생산했으며; (3) 펀딩 및 사회적 펀딩 펀딩을 결합하면 디지털 펀딩 수치의 직접적인 인터페이스 설계에 대한 디지털 펀딩

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Digital nudges have become a prominent area of research in human-centered interaction, yet little is known about how they interact when deployed together. This study examines the individual and combined effects of anchoring, salience, and social proof digital nudges on stopping behavior and outcome quality in a sequential decision task. Using a 2^3 between-subjects factorial design grounded in the secretary problem (N = 181), we find that (1) an anchor nudge significantly increased exploration rather than constraining it (b = 1.207, p = .017); (2) the salience nudge produced the smallest effect of any condition; and (3) combining the anchor and social proof nudges produced the worst outcome quality of any condition ($181.83 vs. $192.21 for anchor-only), with outcome quality declining monotonically as nudge count increased. These findings provide the first controlled evidence for a digital nudge crowding-out effect with direct implications for the ethical design of digital interfaces.

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Topics: Nudge theory, Outcome (game theory), Salience (neuroscience), Quality (philosophy), Computer science, Behavioral economics

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