Jun Yeong Lee · 2026 · SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.7579998 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF
가격 알고리즘이 합병한다는 증거는 모든 판매자가 동일한 알고리즘을 실행하는 시장에서 온다. 우리는 그들이 그렇지 않을 때 무슨 일이 일어나는지 묻습니다. 4 개의 공급 업체로부터 4 개의 언어 모델, 각각 가장 저렴한 수준에서, 4 개의 회사 logit Bertrand 시장에서 통신없이 가격, 모든 동일한, 2 대 2 및 완전히 혼합 된 화합물 (11 셀, 20 실행, 200 기간). 합병은 모델의 속성입니다 : Claude와 Gemini 시장은 독점 임대의 72%에서 79%에 도달하며 DeepSeek 시장은 24%에 도달하며 GPT 시장은 없습니다.
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
Evidence that pricing algorithms collude comes from markets in which every seller runs the same algorithm. We ask what happens when they do not. Four language models from four providers, each at its cheapest tier, price in a four-firm logit Bertrand market without communication, in every homogeneous, two-by-two and fully mixed composi- tion (11 cells, 20 runs, 200 periods). Collusion is a property of the model: Claude and Gemini markets reach 72 to 79 percent of the monopoly rent, DeepSeek markets 24 percent, and GPT markets none, though GPT prices drift above the monopoly level rather than to
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Topics: Collusion, Monopoly, Homogeneous, Economics, Microeconomics, Transitive relation
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