Vinzenz Pyka, André Rieder · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.12049 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF
Les employeurs allemands soutiennent que les conventions collectives limitent leur flexibilité en ce qui concerne les heures de travail. En utilisant les données du Groupe d’établissement de l’IAB pour les années 2008 à 2024, nous enquêtons sur les ajustements de temps de travail après la sortie de la négociation collective. Nous constatons que la sortie n’est associée qu’à une augmentation modeste des heures de travail hebdomadaires d’environ 0,3 à 0,6 % en utilisant des modèles d’études d’effets fixes et d’événements, ce qui correspond à huit à treize minutes supplémentaires par semaine. Cet ajustement se produit peu de temps après la sortie de la couverture de négociation collective. Nous ne trouvons aucune preuve que d’autres mar
Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.
Employers in Germany argue that collective agreements restrict their flexibility concerning working hours. Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the years 2008 to 2024, we investigate working-time adjustments after exit from collective bargaining. We find that exit is associated with only a modest increase in weekly working hours of around 0.3 to 0.6 per cent using fixed-effects and event-study models, corresponding to eight to thirteen additional minutes per week. This adjustment occurs shortly after leaving collective bargaining coverage. We further find no evidence that other margins of working-time adjustment, such as Saturday or Sunday work, are used more extensively after exit. In contrast to previous survey evidence, our findings call into question that working-hours constraints are one of the main drivers of exit from collective bargaining coverage.
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Topics: Collective bargaining, Economics, Flexibility (engineering), Labour economics, Collective action, Panel data
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