Newest papers

Long Term Pediatric Vaccine Tender Scheduling with Quantity Discounts

Nicholas Uhorchak, Rubén A. Proaño, Sandra D. Ekşioğlu, Burak Ekşioğlu · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.19045 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

French

Les achats de vaccins pédiatriques guidés par HP pour les pays à revenu faible et intermédiaire (LICs et LMICs) nécessitent une coordination à long terme sur les marchés de vaccins hétérogènes, des objectifs d’accès aux parties prenantes concurrentiels et une demande incertaine, mais les appels d’offres sont actuellement programmés comme une série de renouvellements indépendants. Nous étendons le cadre du marché des vaccins hypothétiquement coordonné (HCVM) pour planifier des appels d’offres pluriannuels avec des longueurs flexibles et des réductions quantitatives sur toutes les unités, et comparer trois objectifs: un modèle de coordination équilibrée (UG), un modèle de bénéfice social qui minimise les

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Pediatric vaccine procurement for low- and lower-middle-income countries (LICs and LMICs) requires long-term coordination across heterogeneous vaccine markets, competing stakeholder objectives, and uncertain demand, yet tenders are currently scheduled as a series of independent renewals. We extend the Hypothetically Coordinated Vaccine Market (HCVM) framework to schedule multi-year tenders with flexible lengths and all-unit quantity discounts, and compare three objectives: a balanced coordinatingentity model (UG), a social-benefit model that minimizes missed doses (SB), and a producer profit-maximizing model (MP). Using UNICEF ten-year demand forecasts and 30 demand replications across six discount scenarios, we find that the procurement objective, not demand variability, drives cost-to-tender and schedule complexity. Quantity discounts favor large producers, concentrating the market and increasing supply chain vulnerability. Discount effectiveness depends on market maturity rather than valency: pentavalent and hexavalent vaccines are already near their price floor, and among monovalent vaccines only rotavirus responds to discounts, whereas HPV and PCV remain too expensive to compete. Removing pentavalent and hexavalent vaccines from the procurement pool sharply increases missed doses. These results give planners practical guidance on objective selection, discount design, and protecting access to combination vaccines.

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Topics: Call for bids, Procurement, Bidding, Schedule, Business, Reservation

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