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Long Term Pediatric Vaccine Tender Scheduling with Quantity Discounts

Nicholas Uhorchak, Rubén A. Proaño, Sandra D. Ekşioğlu, Burak Ekşioğlu · 2026 · arXiv (Cornell University)

DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2610.19045 · cited by 0 works (OpenAlex) · open-access PDF

Portuguese

A aquisição de vacinas pediátricas orientadas pela HP para países de baixa e média renda (LICs e LMICs) requer coordenação a longo prazo em mercados heterogêneos de vacinas, objetivos de acesso de partes interessadas concorrentes e demanda incerta, mas as licitações são atualmente agendadas como uma série de renovações independentes. Estendemos o quadro do Mercado de Vacinas Hipoteticamente Coordenadas (HCVM) para agendar licitações plurianuais com comprimentos flexíveis e descontos de quantidade de todas as unidades, e comparar três objetivos: um modelo de coordenação equilibrada (UG), um modelo de benefício social que minimiza as doses perdidas (SB), e um modelo de maximizar o lucro do produtor (MP). Usando essas licitações de dez anos da UNIC

Machine translation (Meta M2M100); the English original follows.

Abstract

Pediatric vaccine procurement for low- and lower-middle-income countries (LICs and LMICs) requires long-term coordination across heterogeneous vaccine markets, competing stakeholder objectives, and uncertain demand, yet tenders are currently scheduled as a series of independent renewals. We extend the Hypothetically Coordinated Vaccine Market (HCVM) framework to schedule multi-year tenders with flexible lengths and all-unit quantity discounts, and compare three objectives: a balanced coordinatingentity model (UG), a social-benefit model that minimizes missed doses (SB), and a producer profit-maximizing model (MP). Using UNICEF ten-year demand forecasts and 30 demand replications across six discount scenarios, we find that the procurement objective, not demand variability, drives cost-to-tender and schedule complexity. Quantity discounts favor large producers, concentrating the market and increasing supply chain vulnerability. Discount effectiveness depends on market maturity rather than valency: pentavalent and hexavalent vaccines are already near their price floor, and among monovalent vaccines only rotavirus responds to discounts, whereas HPV and PCV remain too expensive to compete. Removing pentavalent and hexavalent vaccines from the procurement pool sharply increases missed doses. These results give planners practical guidance on objective selection, discount design, and protecting access to combination vaccines.

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Topics: Call for bids, Procurement, Bidding, Schedule, Business, Reservation

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